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Abstract
We use experimental data to disentangle signaling and budgetary effects of price
on wine demand. The experimental design allows us to isolate in a simple and
intuitive way the two effects. The signaling effect is present and nonlinear: it is
strongly positive between e 3 and e 5, and undetectable between e 5 and e 8. We
find a similar nonlinear price-quality relationship in a large sample of wine ratings
from the same price segment, supporting the hypothesis that taster behavior in the
experiment is consistent with rationally using prices as signals of quality. Price
signals also have greater importance for inexperienced (young) consumers.
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1 Introduction
We use experimental data to disentangle signaling and budgetary effects of price on wine
demand. The first is the change in perceived quality associated with a price change, the
second is the change in demand associated with a price change holding quality constant.
The participants in the experiment are non-professional wine tasters who choose a pre-
ferred wine and the wine they would buy after tasting four different wines. Because of
the experimental design, their stated choices allow us to isolate in a simple and intuitive
way the signaling effect of price.
Wine is an interesting product to study because price and quality are subject to a
large variation. It is also a complex “experience good” (Ali and Nauges, 2007) whose
quality depends on many attributes (appearance, in glass aroma, in mouth sensations,
aftertaste, etc.) and may be fully revealed only by following the complicated protocols
of wine tasting. For non-professional wine tasters quality may be difficult to assess even
after consumption. This has two consequences. First, prices adjust slowly as consumers
learn. For example, Ashenfelter (2008) shows that weather conditions help predict the
quality of Bordeaux wines, but market prices of “negatively” shocked vintages adjust
only very slowly over time. Were quality perfectly observable, the process would be
instantaneous. Second, there is scope for experts. For example, Ali et al. (2008) find that
with his oenological grades Robert Parker, perhaps the best-known wine expert, is able to
influence the demand for wines and their prices. Again, with perfectly observable quality,
there would be no need for experts to measure it.
Whenever consumers cannot pin down the value of a product prior to purchase, firms
might use a variety of tools to signal quality, including advertising and prices. This implies
that product quality, prices and advertising are jointly determined. Of course, “for a signal
to be effective, it must be unprofitable for sellers of low-quality products to imitate it”
(Spence, 1976). Spence (1976), Tellis and Wernerfelt (1987), and Mahenc (2004) show
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that prices signal quality, unless there are too many uninformed buyers in the market and
a pooling equilibrium with just one price prevails. Shapiro (1983) shows that when buyers
cannot observe product quality there is an incentive for sellers to reduce quality and take
short-run gains before buyers catch on. To forestall such quality cutting, the equilibrium
price-quality schedule involves high quality items selling at a premium above their cost.
This premium also compensates sellers for their investment in reputation.
Despite the large theoretical literature on the signaling value of prices or advertising
(see Bagwell, 2007, for an overview), most of the empirical literature focuses on the
observed correlation between price and quality in non-experimetal data. An early paper
by Oxenfeldt (1950) finds evidence of a positive correlation, but later studies find that the
correlation at times is negative. Tellis and Wernerfelt (1987) and Rao and Monroe (1989)
provide a meta-analysis of these studies. The contrasting results may depend on either
the nature of the products under investigation or how informed the consumers are. More
importantly, because product quality, prices and advertising are jointly determined, most
of the empirical literature describes statistical associations and provides little information
on the causal mechanisms at work. Further, since in non-experimental data quality is
typically correlated with price and is hard to measure, it is unable to isolate the signaling
effect of prices from the its budgetary effects.
A few papers have tried to exploit supposedly exogenous variation in signals of prod-
uct quality. For example, Ippolito and Mathios (1990, 1995) use variation in regulatory
bans against producer advertising to show that consumers of ready-to-eat cereals extract
information from advertising. One issue with their approach is that in non-experimental
data it is hard to separate the effect of exposure to advertising from the effect of budgetary
constraints, quality, brand loyalty or experience.
Plassmann et al. (2008) use brain imaging to show that artificially increasing the price
of wines told to tasters not only increases their reported pleasantness, but also activates a
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part of their brain (the medial orbitofrontal cortex) that has been shown to be associated
with experienced pleasantness.
Heffetz and Shayo (2009) perform a lab experiment in which participants choose be-
tween two candies with varying relative prices. They find that the pure price elasticities
of demand, which they call the budget constraint (BC) price elasticities, are around -1,
while the additional effects driven by signaling, which they call non-BC elasticities, are
positive but much smaller in absolute value (between 0.09 and 0.18). They also find that
these non-BC elasticities become significant only after the candy has been tasted, which is
somehow puzzling. They perform an additional field experiment showing that measured
non-BC effects are close to zero.
We see our contributions as complementary to those of Heffetz and Shayo (2009).
First, we consider a different type of product (wine), for which the non-BC effect of
price is likely to be strong. Since wine tasting is a noisy signal of wine quality, rational
consumers should take higher price as a signal of higher quality if there is a positive price-
quality relationship in the market. In fact, the data we collected on Italian wines show
a strong positive relationship between price and quality over the price range relevant for
our experiment. Second, unlike Heffetz and Shayo (2009)’s homogeneous sample of 186
students, our sample of wine tasters is more representative of the actual population of
wine consumers and allows us to test whether the signaling effect of price depends on
background characteristics of consumers.
We find that for lower priced wines the signaling effect of price dominates, so demand
increases as price increases, while for higher priced wines the budgetary effect dominates.
This signaling effect is driven by signaling of quality, not by determination of status. We
show that these findings are consistent with the price-quality relationship observed in the
Italian market, which is stronger for lower priced wines in the sense that consumers learn
a lot about the quality of these wines from their price. Such non-linearity in the effect
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goes against a “status” effect of price. Moreover, the signaling effect is larger among
younger and presumably less experienced consumers, which we view as further evidence
for price signaling quality rather than status.1
Although our data contains only stated choices (without an exchange of money for
the product), as opposed to actual choices, the typical concerns about stated preferences
do not apply in our setting. Participants were not asked to state willingness to pay,
which could be inflated if actual payments are not made.2 The alternatives did not differ
in “socially desirable characteristics”, which could be overvalued in stated preferences.
Wine quality was not revealed to respondents, but could only be learned through tasting.
There are some similarities between our identification strategy and the approach pro-
posed in the marketing literature by Gautschi and Rao (1990) in order to separate the
budgetary from the signaling price effect. Recently, Rao and Sattler (2003) and Vo¨lckner
and Sattler (2005) have run similar experiments finding evidence of a signaling effect. The
main difference is that our statistical model allows us to evaluate the statistical signifi-
cance of the various components of the price effect and permits their effect to vary with
the characteristics of the product and the consumers. We also closely link our empirical
specification to an explicit model of consumer demand.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out our conceptual
framework. Section 3 describes the experimental data we use. Section 4 presents our
econometric specification. Section 5 illustrates our empirical results. Section 6 adds some
supporting evidence on the relationship between price and quality. Finally, Section 7
concludes.
1 Since higher priced wines are on average of better quality, this result is in line with the result by
Goldstein et al. (2008) who find that when tasters are unaware of the price only the more experienced
ones derive more enjoyment from more expensive wines. It is also in line with Schnabel and Storchmann
(2010) who, in a non-experimental setting, show that the price signal decreases as the fraction of informed
buyers increases.
2 Ding et al. (2005) show that when consumers are asked to state their willingness to pay, subjects
show less price sensitivity than when the choice is incentivised. While this might bias our results toward
finding no budgetary effect, it would not explain the heterogeneity in the signaling effect along price levels
and informedness of consumers we later describe.
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2 Conceptual framework
In this section we introduce a simple demand model where quality is not perfectly ob-
servable and prices have a non-budgetary effect on demand through their signaling value.
The model is introduced to discipline the econometric specification in Section 4.
Demand of a good, in our case wine, is assumed to be a smooth function
D = D(X,P,Q) (1)
of a set X of individual characteristics (income, demographics, etc.), the price of the good
P , and its perceived quality Q. According to the “Law of Demand”, we expect demand to
respond negatively to a price increase, that is, DP = ∂D/∂P ≤ 0. We also expect demand
to respond positively to an increase in perceived quality, that is, DQ = ∂D/∂Q ≥ 0.
Perceived quality is assumed to be a smooth function
Q = Q(X,SP , S1, . . . , Sm), (2)
of individual characteristics X, product price SP (used as a signal of quality) and a set
of signals S1, . . . , Sm other than price, such as sensory evaluation and other information.
We expect perceived quality to respond positively to a price increase, that is, QSP =
∂Q/∂SP ≥ 0, and we shall henceforth refer to QSP as the signaling value of price. We
also define signals in such a way that QSj = ∂Q/∂Sj > 0, j = 1, . . . ,m.
Substituting (2) back into (1) gives the following reduced-form relationship between
demand and price
D = D(X,P,Q(X,SP , S1, . . . , Sm)) = D˜(X,P, SP , S1, . . . , Sm).
In observational data SP = P , that is, the market price P entering the demand equation
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is the same as the price signal SP influencing consumer’s perception of product quality.
When P and SP are identical, reduced-form demand is
D∗(X,P, S1, . . . , Sm) = D(X,P,Q(X,P, S1, . . . , Sm)).
Estimation of D∗ reveals only the sum of the budgetary and signaling effects of price
D∗P = DP +DQQSP
If demand does not depend on quality (that is, DQ = 0), or prices have no signaling value
(that is, QSP = 0), then D
∗
P = DP . In general, however, DQ > 0 and QSP > 0. So DP
cannot be identified from knowledge of D∗P alone. Without additional information (e.g.
credible IV restrictions), we can only conclude that DP < D
∗
P . This may be useful if
D∗P < 0. However, if DQ or QSP are sufficiently large, we may have it that DP ≤ 0 < D∗P .
We use data that offer the unique opportunity of separately learning about DP and
DQQSP . In an experimental setting, consumers could be offered to buy the product at
different prices P , holding fixed the product’s market price SP that influences perceived
product quality. Variation of P , holding SP fixed, identifies the budgetary effect of price
D˜P = DP . Variation of P and SP together (holding them equal) identifies the reduced
form effect D∗P , and hence the signaling effect DQQSP .
3 Data
The data that we use contain information on stated choices by a sample of 183 nonpro-
fessional wine tasters who participated, between December 2007 and February 2008, in
three blind wine tasting experiments held near Conegliano, in the North-Eastern Italian
region of Veneto.
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The experiments were jointly organized by the CRA-VIT, Dipartimento del Territorio
e dei Sistemi Agro-Forestali at the University of Padua, and Dipartimento di Tecnica e
Gestione dei Sistemi industriali also at the University of Padua. Each experiment was
devoted to one of the typical wines from Eastern Veneto: the first (52 subjects) to Pros-
ecco from Conegliano-Valdobbiadene (henceforth Prosecco for simplicity), the second (59
subjects) to Merlot from Piave (henceforth Merlot), and the third (72 subjects) to Tocai
Italico from Lison-Pramaggiore (henceforth Tocai). None of the subjects participated in
more than one experiment. In what follows we provide basic information on the experi-
mental design and refer to Tempesta et al. (2010) for further details.
In each experiment, five choice tasks (tastings) were proposed involving wines of the
same type but different intrinsic quality. Thus, the data from each experiment may be
regarded as a balanced panel with repeated observations on each subject. In each choice
task, subjects were asked to state their preferred wine profile among the four proposed
(the precise wording was “Which one of the just tasted wines do you prefer?”), and the
profile they would buy (the precise wording was “Which one of the just tasted wines
would you buy?”). Since the none option (“none of the offered wines”) was also allowed,
the available choice set contains five alternatives.
A proposed wine profile consisted of a unique combination of three attributes: ob-
jective wine quality and randomly assigned price and landscape type. Wine quality was
classified into low, medium or high depending on the value of a hedonic index constructed
using the numerical evaluations assigned to each wine by a panel of eleven wine experts
to three attributes (olfactory, gustatory-tactile, and retro-olfactory).3 We take the expert
information as an objective attribute of the wine that is assessed by consumers through
tasting. Expert evaluations were not revealed to participants in the experiment.
Three price levels were selected: Euro (e ) 3, 5 and 8 (for a 0.75 litre bottle). Notice
3 See Tempesta et al. (2010) for additional information on the composition of the panel of experts and
the construction of the hedonic index.
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that e 5 is roughly the average retail price of nearly two thousand Italian wines reviewed
between 2006 and 2012 by Altroconsumo, an independent consumer association. For
Merlot, these prices roughly correspond to, respectively, the lower quartile, the median
and the upper quartile of the distribution of retail prices per bottle in 2007–2008. For
Prosecco, which is cheaper than Merlot, they instead correspond to the median, the upper
quartile and the upper decile of the distribution of retail prices. The case of Tocai falls
in-between these two extremes.
As for landscape, images were selected for each of four landscape types: evocative
(in which a historic building is placed in the vineyard background), traditional (showing
vineyards cultivated on small plots of land, with scattered hedges, meadows and trees),
modern (showing large-scale vineyards cultivated on large plots), and degraded (in which
industrial buildings are visible in the vineyard background). These images represented
actual vineyards in the area of production of Prosecco (the hills between the towns of
Conegliano and Valdobbianee) and the area of production of Merlot and Tocai Italico
(the plains between the rivers Livenza and Piave). Tasters were led to believe that the
price was the real price of the tasted wines, and that the landscape image represented the
environment where the tasted wines were produced.
In practice, of the 3×3×4 = 36 possible wine profiles, only 4×5 = 20 were randomly
selected in each experiment. One feature of the experimental design is that, in each choice
task, two of the proposed wines were of the same quality and two had the same price.
This design makes it easier to identify the separate effect of quality and price on demand.
The experiments were mainly aimed at studying how wine preferences were linked to
landscape features, the basic idea being that “the beauty of the landscape can positively
affect the wine quality perception” (Tempesta et al., 2010). However, because of their
design, they can also be used to study how perception of wine quality is linked to price.
Notice that price and landscape are often used by producers to signal the quality of a good.
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In typical observational studies, demand, price and quality are endogenous. The main
advantages of our experimental setting is that, by design, price, landscape and intrinsic
quality are orthogonal to each other and exogenous to demand.
The data also contain background information about the wine tasters, namely de-
mographic information on age group (18–24, 25–39, 40–60, or 60+), gender, province of
residence (Padua, Treviso, or other), and type of residential location (urban center, sub-
urb, rural center, or rural area), plus information on wine consumption patterns including
weekly wine consumption (do not drink, 1/2 liter or less, 1/2 to 1 liter, 1 to 3 liters, or
more than 3 liters), type of shop where wine is bought (not mutually exclusive: wineries,
wine shops, supermarket/food shops), and previous participation in wine tasting courses.
Table 1 summarizes individual characteristics of the wine tasters. The sample consists
predominantly of men (73 percent), living in urban centers or suburbs (62 percent), with
weekly wine consumption above 1 liter (65 percent), without previous wine course experi-
ence (74 percent), and buying mostly from wineries (80 percent). Tempesta et al. (2010)
argue that the sample may be regarded as broadly representative of the wine drinking
population in the Veneto region, an area of Italy where “wine culture” is very important
and deeply rooted.
We find little evidence of inconsistency between preferred and buy choices. Tasters
choose a less expensive wine as their buying choice in 15.7 percent of choice tasks, whereas
they choose a more expensive wine to buy in only 3.6 percent of tasks. We do not remove
these observations from analysis, instead, our specification allows random components of
preferred and buying choices to differ.
4 Econometric specification
Labeling by j = 0, . . . , 4 the five alternatives available in each choice task, with the
alternative j = 0 corresponding to the none option, we interpret the stated preferred
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choice among the alternatives in choice task t as the result of maximizing the additive
random utility
U jtP =

ε0tP , if j = 0,
V (X,SjtP , S
jt
Q , S
jt
L ) + ε
jt
P , if j = 1, . . . , 4,
where V (X,SP , SQ, SL) is the average utility that a consumer with observable character-
istics X attributes to wine with quality signals (SP , SQ, SL). In addition to the price SP ,
we have two other quality signals: wine taste and landscape. SQ is the wine tasting grade
assigned to the wine by a panel of experts. This grade was not revealed to subjects in
the experiment and we use it as a proxy for their own assessment of the wines through
tasting. SL is the signal provided by the landscapes.
We similarly interpret the stated buy choice among alternatives j = 0, . . . , 4 in choice
task t as the result of maximizing the additive random utility
U jtB =

ε0tB , if j = 0,
C(X,P jt) + V (X,SjtP , S
jt
Q , S
jt
L ) + ε
jt
B , if j = 1, . . . , 4,
where C(X,P ) is the disutility of spending P for a consumer with observable character-
istics X.
In our empirical specification, εjtP and ε
jt
B are assumed to be drawn from the same
Type I extreme value distribution (implying a conditional multinomial logit specifica-
tion), and to be distributed independently across alternatives in the same choice task and
across individuals. In calculating robust standard errors, we allow the error terms to be
correlated across choice tasks for the same individual.
We can map the demand shares in the random utility model to the reduced-form
demand function D˜ in our conceptual framework. Consider a consumer choosing between
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K alternative wines with attributes (P k, SkP , S
k
Q, S
k
L), k = 1, ..., K (not necessarily the
same alternatives as offered in the experiment). Then the demand (market share) for
alternative k among consumers with the same observable characteristics X equals
D˜k = D˜(X,P k, SkP , S
k
Q, S
k
L) =
exp(C(X,P k) + V (X,SkP , S
k
Q, S
k
L))∑
j=1..K exp(C(X,P
j) + V (X,SjP , S
j
Q, S
j
L))
.
The derivatives of D˜k with respect to attributes of product k are proportional to the
derivatives of C(X,P k) + V (X,SkP , S
k
Q, S
k
L):
∂D˜k
∂P k
= D˜k(1− D˜k)∂C(X,P
k)
∂P k
,
∂D˜k
∂SkP
= D˜k(1− D˜k)∂V (X,S
k
P , S
k
P , S
k
L)
∂SkP
.
When the functions C(·) and V (·) are linear in product attributes, derivatives of the
demand function are proportional to their coefficients.
Our specification assumes that C(·) is linear in the product price and V (·) is additive
in product attributes:
C(X,P ) = βMP,
V (X,SP , SQ, SL) = β0 + VP (SP ) + VQ(SQ) + VL(SL).
Our data contains three different values of price signal SP , three different categories of
intrinsic wine quality SQ and four types of landscape SL. We employ a fully nonlinear
specification for VP , VQ and VL using nested indicator functions for different values to
facilitate comparisons:
SP ∈ [e 3, e 5, e 8],
VP (SP ) = βP2 I[SP ∈ {e 5, e 8}] + βP3 I[SP ∈ {e 8}].
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In this specification, βP2 = VP (e 5)− VP (e 3) and βP3 = VP (e 8)− VP (e 5). Coefficient
β0 absorbs baseline values of VP (e 3), VQ(low) and VL(degraded).
Similarly, our specification for the signaling effects of intrinsic quality and landscape
is:
SQ ∈[low, medium, high],
VQ(SQ) =βQ2 I[SQ ∈ {medium, high}] + βQ3 I[SQ ∈ {high}],
SL ∈[degraded, modern, traditional, evocative],
VL(SL) =βL2 I[SL ∈ {modern, traditional, evocative}]+
+ βL3 I[SL ∈ {traditional, evocative}]+
+ βL4 I[SL ∈ {evocative}].
We first estimate the model on the pooled data. We then estimate the model separately
by type of wine and by major demographic group. This allows full interaction between
the price and signaling effects and the characteristics of the products and the consumers.
5 Empirical results
Table 2 presents the results by pooling the data for all wines (second column), and then
separately by wine type (Merlot, Prosecco and Tocai).
In line with the “Law of Demand”, the price response of demand (βM) is negative and
strongly statistically significant.
The signaling value of price (βP2 and βP3) appears to be nonlinear, as we observe
a strong and statistically significant positive effect of increasing the price from e 3 to
e 5 but no effect of increasing the price from e 5 to e 8. In this case, the effect is
actually negative, although very small in magnitude and not statistically significant. This
is consistent with the finding in Plassmann et al. (2008) that the effect of a price increase
on medial orbitofrontal cortex activity is larger at low ($5) than at high prices ($10).
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As for the signaling value of intrinsic quality, we observe a positive and statistically
significant effect of increasing quality. Interestingly, the incremental change from low to
medium (βQ2) is about the same as the incremental change from medium to high (βQ3).
As for the signaling value of landscape, we observe no statistically significant difference
between degraded and modern landscapes (βL2), or between traditional and evocative
landscapes (βL4). On the other hand, we observe a strongly positive and statistically
significant effect of varying the landscape from modern to traditional (βL3). Thus, it
seems that the consumers only distinguish between two types of landscape: degraded or
modern on the one hand, and traditional or evocative on the other end.
These findings remain essentially the same when we consider each wine type separately.
The budgetary effects are strikingly similar. The signaling value of price exhibits a similar
strongly nonlinear profile for all wine types. The signaling value of intrinsic quality is the
only dimension where a difference emerges between Merlot and Tocai on the one hand
and Prosecco on the other hand. While the incremental changes from low to medium
quality and from medium to high quality are always positive for the first two wine types,
they actually have opposite signs and low statistical significance for Prosecco, so the
incremental change from low to high quality (βQ2 +βQ3) is close to zero. Thus, consumers
appear to have a hard time distinguishing Prosecco quality at a tasting. Finally, the
signaling value of landscape is generally consistent across wine types.
Table 3 investigates the issue of heterogeneity in preferences across major demographic
groups. The first column reproduces the first column in Table 2 and contains the results
from the pooled data. The next two columns compare younger (18–39 yy) and older
consumers (40+ yy), while the last two columns compare men and women.
While the budgetary effects of prices are the same between younger and older con-
sumers, and the signaling value of prices is similar, the signaling value of quality and
landscape appear to be different. As for quality, the incremental change from low to
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medium is positive for both groups, but is much lower and less statistically significant for
younger consumers. On the other hand, the change from medium to high quality only
affects the demand of older consumers positively. Further, in relative terms, the signaling
effect of prices is much more important for younger, and presumably inexperienced con-
sumers than it is for the older ones. This is consistent with the effect of prices carrying
some additional information about the quality that less-knowledgeable consumers appre-
ciate more. Finally, younger and older consumers appear to rank landscapes categorized
as modern and degraded differently.
As for the comparison between men and women, many coefficients are less precisely
estimated for women because they only represent 27 percent of the sample. The main
gender difference appears to be the signaling value of prices. While this has a nonlinear
profile for both men and women, the incremental change from e 5 to e 8 is different,
namely negative for women and positive for men.
6 Price-quality relationship in the market
There are two reasons why consumers may prefer higher-priced wines even after having
a chance to test them. First, price could provide consumers with additional information
about product quality even after tasting if they are correlated in the marketplace and
tasting provides an imperfect signal of quality. Second, a higher price may have some
intrinsic value for consumers (e.g. display social status when consumption is visible to
others). In this section we use wine price-quality data for Italy to show that consumers’
behavior in the experiment is consistent with the signaling theory.
We estimate the price-quality relationship using wine quality ratings provided to us by
Altroconsumo, the main Italian consumer association. This dataset includes 1,950 wines
reviewed between 2006 and 2012 in the annual wine guide published by the association and
represents the most comprehensive source of price-quality data for commonly consumed
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Italian wines. Although the guide is not a representative sample of wines from the Veneto
region, it covers wines sold countrywide, and we see no reason why the slope of the price-
quality relationship should systematically differ for the Veneto region relative to the rest
of Italy. The median price in the sample is e 4.70 and less than one percent of rated wines
are priced above e 15. The price range used in the experiment is covered particularly well:
74% of the rated wines have prices between e 3 and e 8 per bottle. Each wine received
a degustation mark ranging from A to D, as well as a composite quality score on a 100
point scale. The composite score uses information from the chemical analysis of the wine
in addition to the degustation results.
Generally, there is a positive relationship between wine prices and Altroconsumo rat-
ings in the sample. Figure 1 shows a nonparametric regression estimate (LOWESS) of
the relationship between price and two quality measures: the average composite score and
the probability of getting a high (A or B) degustation grade (the last panel shows the
frequency of wine prices). This relationship seems particularly strong for lower prices.
Since the ratings are available for a large number of wines in the price range between
e 3 and e 8, we could directly measure the price-quality relationship at the price points in
our experimental data. The upper half of Table 4 shows the average composite score and
the probability of A or B degustation marks for wines with prices exactly equal to e 3,
e 5, and e 8. The bottom half of the table compares average quality measures for larger
samples of wines whose rounded prices are equal to the price points in our experimental
data. The results using the composite quality score match experimental findings most
closely: the average scores of e 5 wines are significantly higher than those of e 3 wines,
while there is only a negligible difference between the average scores of e 5 and e 8 wines.
The probability of getting an A or B degustation mark is also significantly higher for e 5
wines than for e 3 wines. This probability rises less when moving from e 5 to e 8.
The strength of the price-quality relationship could also be measured through their
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correlation. The correlation between price and composite score equals 0.1087 for prices
between e 3 and e 5. For the e 5–8 price range, the correlation is only 0.0253. The
correlations between price and an indicator of A/B degustation mark equal 0.0963 for the
lower price range and 0.0392 for the higher price range.
Assuming that Altroconsumo wine ratings are aligned with consumer preferences,
rational consumers should take e 5 as a signal of higher quality than e 3, but treat e 5
and e 8 as signals of fairly similar quality. Their behavior in the wine tasting experiment is
thus consistent with using price as a signal of quality. Notice that Altroconsumo reviews
many more wines in the e 3–5 range than in the e 5–8 range (this is very visible in
Figure 1), which may be one of the mechanisms by which consumers are more informed
about quality in this segment of the market, and producers have to set prices more in
line with the quality. This relationship may reverse at higher prices, since wine critics are
particularly interested in reviewing the best wines.
7 Conclusions
Our paper isolates and measures the signaling effect of price on wine demand by exploiting
the experimental nature of our data. In line with Plassmann et al. (2008) we find a larger
signaling effect of price for lower priced wines. The signaling effect is positive when going
from a low (e 3) to a medium price (e 5), but is essentially zero when going from a
medium to a high price (e 8).
Consumers are rational in responding to price signals in this way. In data on price and
quality for the Italian wine market, we find a strong positive price-quality relationship
for wines in the e 3–5 price range, but not in the e 5–8 price range. Lack of a strong
positive price-quality relationship at higher prices may be driven by differences in the
costs of marketing and distributing wine of different quality. It may also depend on
more complicated price strategies by the producers, which might even interact with their
16
reputation. Since we lack product-level time-series data on wines, we leave such questions
open to future research.
We also find that older consumers appear to be better able to appreciate actual quality
than young consumers, which gives more weight to the signaling of quality rather than
status (unless we think that the desire to signal status decreases with age).
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Table 1: Summary statistics.
Subjects Percent
Wine tasting:
Merlot 59 32
Prosecco 52 28
Tocai 72 39
Age group:
18–24 22 12
25–39 90 49
40–60 61 33
60+ 10 5
Gender:
Female 50 27
Male 133 73
Type of residence:
Urban center 59 32
Suburb 54 30
Rural center 19 10
Rural area 51 28
Weekly wine consumption:
None 2 1
Less than .5L 24 13
.5L–1L 37 20
1L–3L 103 56
More than 3L 17 9
Attended wine tasting courses: 48 26
Buy wine? 167 91
Buy from wineries? 147 80
Buy from wine shops? 23 13
Buy from supermarkets? 29 16
Total 183 100
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Table 2: Results by wine type.
Pooled Merlot Prosecco Tocai
βM Budgetary effect (per e 1) -0.101*** -0.109*** -0.0902*** -0.105***
(0.0141) (0.0251) (0.0235) (0.0243)
Signaling effect of price:
Baseline: e 3
βP2 e 5 vs. e 3 0.761*** 0.600*** 0.967*** 0.818***
(0.111) (0.186) (0.229) (0.175)
βP3 e 8 vs. e 5 -0.0631 -0.0388 0.0320 -0.151
(0.0778) (0.142) (0.139) (0.127)
Intrinsic quality:
Baseline: low
βQ2 medium vs. low 0.269*** 0.289** 0.267 0.298**
(0.0873) (0.145) (0.177) (0.138)
βQ3 high vs. medium 0.221** 0.358* -0.318* 0.423***
(0.0946) (0.189) (0.177) (0.115)
Landscape:
Baseline: degraded
βL2 modern vs. degraded 0.0231 -0.0963 0.434* -0.111
(0.121) (0.207) (0.255) (0.181)
βL3 traditional vs. modern 0.456*** 0.420** 0.443** 0.524***
(0.110) (0.188) (0.196) (0.188)
βL4 evocative vs. traditional 0.124 0.0837 -0.0349 0.255*
(0.0877) (0.166) (0.160) (0.137)
β0 Value of baseline bottle 0.138 0.472 -0.456 0.179
(0.199) (0.345) (0.394) (0.317)
# Subjects 183 59 52 72
Notes: For each subject we have 5 tastings, with 4 wine alternatives and the choice of none. Standard
errors in parentheses (clustered by individual): *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
22
Table 3: Results by demographic group.
Pooled 18–39 yy 40+ yy Male Female
βM Budgetary effect (per e 1) -0.101*** -0.100*** -0.108*** -0.0936*** -0.120***
(0.0141) (0.0185) (0.0218) (0.0157) (0.0294)
Signaling effect of price:
Baseline: e 3
βP2 e 5 vs. e 3 0.761*** 0.727*** 0.907*** 0.739*** 0.842***
(0.111) (0.149) (0.163) (0.125) (0.234)
βP3 e 8 vs. e 5 -0.0631 -0.0537 -0.0891 -0.225** 0.335**
(0.0778) (0.102) (0.126) (0.0921) (0.135)
Intrinsic quality:
Baseline: low
βQ2 medium vs. low 0.269*** 0.212* 0.421*** 0.286*** 0.209
(0.0873) (0.111) (0.136) (0.106) (0.148)
βQ3 high vs. medium 0.221** -0.128 0.677*** 0.186* 0.337*
(0.0946) (0.115) (0.145) (0.109) (0.186)
Landscape:
Baseline: degraded
βL2 modern vs. degraded 0.0231 0.287* -0.388** 0.0462 -0.0550
(0.121) (0.169) (0.162) (0.142) (0.232)
βL3 traditional vs. modern 0.456*** 0.403*** 0.610*** 0.494*** 0.378*
(0.110) (0.128) (0.205) (0.132) (0.202)
βL4 evocative vs. traditional 0.124 0.125 0.107 0.128 0.111
(0.0877) (0.107) (0.156) (0.106) (0.158)
β0 Value of baseline bottle 0.138 -0.0916 0.458 0.206 -0.0560
(0.199) (0.252) (0.338) (0.222) (0.426)
# Subjects 183 112 71 133 50
Notes: For each subject we have 5 tastings, with 4 wine alternatives and the choice of none. Standard
errors in parentheses (clustered by individual): *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: Price-quality relationship in Altroconsumo wine ratings.
Exact prices used in the experiment Price = e 3 Difference Price = e 5 Difference Price = e 8
Average composite score 60.80 2.19 62.99 .003 62.99
Standard errors (1.0) (1.44) (1.04) (1.58) (1.07)
N 61 64 38
Probability of A or B degustation mark .5072 .1159 .6232 .0673 .6905
Standard errors (.0606) (.0844) (.0588) (.0941) (.0722)
N 69 69 42
Prices that round to e 3/5/8 Price ≈ e 3 Difference Price ≈ e 5 Difference Price ≈ e 8
Average composite score 59.43 2.52*** 61.94 .33 62.27
Standard errors (.54) (.71) (.47) (1.05) (.96)
N 247 299 74
Probability of A or B degustation mark .4141 .1411*** .5552 .0903 .6456
Standard errors (.0286) (.0395) (.0272) (.0619) (.0542)
N 297 335 79
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Figure 1: Relationship between wine price and Altroconsumo quality measures. Lowess
smoother, 50% bandwidth.
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